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 ABSTRACT 
 
Propositions were tested with original survey data from 224 directors from nineteen hospitals to 
determine the extent of their involvement in the strategic management process. In most areas, board 
members whose occupational background is in health care tend to be less engaged than their 
counterparts whose background is not in health care. Significant differences were observed with 
respect to broad cross-functional strategic issues and overall hospital performance.  Both groups 
had limited involvement in setting standards for rewarding top management and evaluating their 
performance.  The results raise potentially important strategic and ethical dilemmas for hospitals 
and offer proponents of changes in board composition support for their normative suggestions.      
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
here is general agreement among organizational researchers, governance experts, and business executives 
that, traditionally, boards have engaged in the strategic process only to the extent that they legitimized 
proposals from corporate executives (Iacocca, 1984; Shanklin & Ryans, 1981).  However, in recent years, 
the extent to which board members are involved in the corporate strategic decision making process has become of major 
concern. This has sparked many research investigations.  Of particular interest is the board's decision making processes 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999), the structure of its committee membership (Kesner, 1988), its role in strategic management 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992), and its impact on financial performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), CEO succession (Ocasio, 
1999), and social responsibility (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 1995). 
 
BOARD INVOLVEMENT 
 
 To date, the board’s multiple roles and duties have been the most-studied aspect among all board investigations.  
These studies identified several major responsibilities that capture directors' most significant functions.  A list of some of 
these is presented in Table 1. 
 
There is ample empirical evidence from organizations of many different kinds that there are levels of board 
involvement, which can be represented as continua (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  One particularly 
useful framework for evaluating the role of the board of directors in corporate strategic management was developed by 
Wheelen and Hunger (2004).   A board can be characterized as being at a specific point on a continuum depending upon its 
degree of involvement in strategic affairs.  Accordingly, "boards can range from phantom boards with no real involvement 
to catalyst boards with a very high degree of involvement" (p. 28).  aspects of strategic management.   Table 2 shows these 
scales and the areas they purport to measure. 
 
T 
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Table 1.  Responsibilities Of Boards Of Directors 
 
Author(s) Year Responsibilities 
Pfeffer and Salancik   1978   Advice and counsel 
   Oversight and control.  
 
Ong and Lee  2000    Monitoring the actions of executives on behalf of shareholders 
Hillman and Dalziel 2003  Providing input, resources, and advice in formulating strategies 
Johnson et al.  1996  Establishing links with stakeholders 
   Participating in strategic planning 
 
Boulton  1978   Reviewing overall board role and responsibilities  
Reviewing operating variances and problem areas 
  Reviewing objectives and setting standards of performance 
 Reviewing business structure  
 Evaluating strategic and operating plans 
  Reviewing standards for compensation and rewarding performance 
Ensuring the organization's human resource development 
Reviewing external trends 
Setting policies for corporate action  
 
 
 
Table 2. Scales Measuring Board Involvement 
 
Author(s) Year  Purpose of Scale 
Judge and   To measure board involvement in the formulation and evaluation phases of the 
Zeithmal 1992 strategic decision-making process   
 
Westphal  1999    To measure the degree to which directors: 
Blake 1999   monitor top management’s strategic decision making 
   formally evaluate the performance of top executives 
   defer to the judgment of top managers on final strategic decisions 
   develop performance objectives 
   require information showing progress against corporate objectives 
  analyze financial information for important issues and trends 
  analyze budget allocation against performance 
  review company performance against the strategic plan.  
Westphal  1999  To measure the extent to which: 
Dulewicz  top executives solicit board assistance in strategy formulation   
et al. 1995 outside directors serve as a sounding board on strategic issues 
     directors provide advice and counsel outside of board and committee                    
        meetings 
   the board takes into account stakeholders’ legitimate interests  
    the board ensures that communications with stakeholders are effective 
   the board promotes the goodwill and support of relevant stakeholders  
 
Zahra  1990 To measure the degree to which the board:   
Blake  1999   articulates a company mission 
  analyzes the internal and external environments 
  identifies a  strategic plan 
  develops strategic options and selects a final strategy 
  is involved in the strategic planning process 
  communicates the company's strategic direction throughout the company 
  receives plans for the implementation of strategy from the CEO  
  benchmarks the strategic plan with industry comparative data. 
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A sizable amount of study has been devoted to board involvement. Unfortunately, when viewed as a whole, the 
results are mixed and inconclusive, thus limiting the number of definitive conclusions that can be drawn.  Some have found 
that executives are resisting increased board involvement in the strategic process.  Other evidence suggests that board 
members are reacting to various external pressures with active participation.  Table 3 shows a list of the key studies.   
 
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND COMPOSITION 
 
The boards of many types of organizations have been examined from a wide variety of perspectives. More than 
two decades ago a number of writers expressed the need to study the profiles of corporate upper echelons in order to 
understand an organization’s strategic processes.  For example, Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed several hypotheses 
for testing the relationship between organizational outcomes and certain demographic characteristics of top executives.  
They argued that strategic decisions reflect the background of the organization's most influential leaders and the 
organization’s policies and central values could be explained, at least in part, by the profile of its upper echelon. 
 
One common theme that has emerged from research on decision making is that executives are likely to develop 
distinctly different preferences based on their current or past primary functional areas.  These preferences, in turn, are likely 
to affect their choices.  As far back as 1958, Dearborn and Simon reported that top executives tend to define problems in 
terms of the activities and concerns of their own functional areas.  This finding was supported later by a number of studies 
which found that, although top executives are presumed to be generalists, their occupational background biases their 
strategic orientation (Snow & Hrebiniak, 1980; Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987; Norburn, 1986). 
 
Consistent with this view, a relatively small body of literature has focused on the background of one segment of 
the firm's upper echelon - its board of directors.  Of particular interest to researchers is the impact of the board’s 
composition and characteristics on corporate activities.  However, with the exception of studies focusing on the gender of 
board members and the inside director-outside director dichotomy, much of the research tends to treat directors as a 
homogeneous group in spite of evidence to the contrary. 
 
 
Table 3. Board Participation In Strategic Decisions 
 
Author(s) Year Findings 
 
A. Studies Showing Minimal Board Participation   
 
Whisler  1984  “Rules of the game” is to minimize participation in setting strategy 
Mace   1986  Boards do not participate in strategic decisions unless faced with a risis 
 
Patton and Baker  1987  Members are reluctant to “rock the boat” and get involved 
 
Lorsch   1989  Directors want to increase their involvement but are reluctant to do so.   
 
Judge and  The great majority of boards are not actively working with management Zeithaml
  1992 to develop strategic action.   
 
Daily and Dalton 1995 Norms of reciprocity:  Board appointments confer prestige and status, financial 
rewards and various perquisites.  Members feel socially obligated to support the 
CEO and minimize any meaningful participation 
 
Wall Street  1996 Social ties between top managers and outside directors tend to be 
Journal   “chummy” or even “collusive” thus diminishing board effectiveness  
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B. Studies Showing Active Board Participation   
 
Worthy and   A major increase has taken place in the duties, power, and responsibilities Neuschel
  1984  of corporate boards   
 
Westphal  1999  Social ties between the CEO and the board encourage collaboration between top 
managers and outside directors in strategic decision making 
 
Heidrick and  1990  Board members are increasingly involved in determining and monitoring  
Struggles   the strategic directions of the organization.  
 
Dobrzynski 1989 “Quietly, many boards are asserting themselves - redirecting strategy here, 
   vetoing an investment there” (p. 66).   
 
 
 
Table 4. Studies Of Hospital Governing Boards 
 
Author(s)  Year Focus  Findings 
Witt 1993 Board training  Most hospitals did not have any policies for training 
 policies and developing board members.  Most directors did                    
   not have any board experience in large organizations  
 
Molinari at al.  1992  Board training Boards whose members attended training programs 
    programs were better informed about management issues and 
    changes in the external environment, and were associated 
with improved financial performance   
 
Molinari at al. 1997 Relationship CEO participation on boards was associated with  
   with CEO enhanced hospital financial performance  
 
Gardner 1992  Board The importance of including nurses in hospital boards  
   Composition because they have a health care background 
 
Goes and Zhan  1995  Board  Physician membership on boards was associated with    
composition  higher operating margins and occupancy  
 
Molinari at al.   1993 Board A high proportion of directors with business-related  
Delbeq and    composition occupations provided boards with up-to-date opera- 
Gill   1988     tional information and financial and strategic expertise 
 
Gautam and     Board Boards with a higher proportion of insiders and   
Goodstein   1996  composition business directors made more changes in their mix of      
      services in response to legislative reform 
 
Ibrahim et al.   2000  Social respon- Compared to those with a healthcare background,  
         siveness directors who did not have such a  background were               
                                   orientation more concerned with economic and legal issues            
 
 
 
HOSPITAL DIRECTORS 
 
 One important segment of the literature has been devoted to the study of  hospital governing boards.  Table 4 
presents some of the key studies.   Although  these  investigations  have  been  instrumental  in  focusing  attention  on   the 
composition and characteristics of hospital boards, there is still one area which has remained relatively unexplored - the 
relationship between board members’ occupational background and the extent of their involvement in corporate strategy. 
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The present study was designed to investigate this issue.  Specifically, its purpose is to determine whether a relationship 
exists between the occupational background of hospital directors and their degree of involvement in the strategic 
management process.  Drawing on studies involving hospital boards and other previous research (Boulton, 1978; Patton & 
Baker, 1987; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Westphal, 1999; Blake, 1999; Zahra, 1990; Tricker, 1994; Dulewitz at al., 1995; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983), we would expect directors who do not have a healthcare background (NHCB) to be more involved 
in the strategic process than their counterparts who do have a healthcare background (HCB).  Thus, a number of 
propositions were framed to address the following areas: Broad cross-functional strategic matters, overall hospital 
performance, performance of top executives, and internal issues.  They are presented in Table 5.  The health care-no health 
care dichotomy is in line with previous research on hospital governing boards (Gautam & Goodstein, 1996; Ibrahim et al., 
2000; Saleh et al., 2002). 
 
SAMPLE AND RESULTS 
 
 A total of 262 directors from nineteen hospitals in four southeastern and two northeastern states were asked to 
participate in the study. Two hundred-and-twenty-four responses were received (85.5% response rate). Interestingly, the 
response rate from each hospital was in the 81-to-89 percent range.  On the average, the hospitals had 402 set-up-and-
staffed beds. In the questionnaire which was developed to measure the variables of interest, directors were asked to indicate 
their age, education, length of service on the hospital’s board, and occupational background.  To test this study’s 
propositions, a seventeen-item scale was constructed to measure the extent of a board member's participation in corporate 
strategic management.  Responses were made on a four-point scale on which the higher the number the greater the 
perceived involvement. 
 
Table 5. Propositions Regarding Directors Involvement In The Strategic Process 
 
Broad cross-functional strategic matters 
Compared to directors who do have a healthcare background, those without a healthcare background will be more involved in: 
 
 P1A:  Reviewing the board’s overall role and responsibilities     
 P1B:  Defining/reviewing the hospital’s mission/vision statement      
 P1C:  Conducting an analysis of the internal environment       
 P1D:  Conducting an analysis of the external environment        
 P1E:  Taking into account the legitimate interests of major stakeholders      
 P1F:  Promoting the goodwill and support of major stakeholders       
 P1G:  Developing strategic alternatives   
 P1H:   Providing advice and counsel in discussions outside of board/committee meetings 
 
Overall hospital performance 
Compared to directors who do not have a healthcare background, those with a healthcare background will be more involved in: 
          
 P2A: Benchmarking the strategic plan with industry comparative data  
 P2B: Setting standards for overall hospital performance           
 P2C: Evaluating overall hospital performance against the strategic plan    
 P2D:  Analyzing financial information for important issues and trends  
 P2E:   Evaluating operating variances  
        
Performance of top executives   
Compared to directors who do not have a healthcare background, those with a healthcare background will be more involved in: 
  
 P3A: Setting standards for rewarding top management’s performance     
 P3B:  Formally evaluating the performance of top management       
 
Internal matters 
Compared to directors who do not have a healthcare background, those with a healthcare background will be more involved in: 
 P4A:  Reviewing the hospital’s overall structure         
P4B:  Ensuring the hospital’s development of human resources 
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  The respondents were predominantly male (86.3%) and white (90%) with an average age of 56.4 years.  On the 
average, they had served for 7.0 years on their respective boards.  Ninety-six percent had an undergraduate college degree, 
28 percent were medical doctors, and 33 percent earned a graduate or professional degree. Approximately three-quarters 
(77%) of these boards meet monthly, 16 percent meet bimonthly, and 7 percent hold quarterly meetings.  Finally, in terms 
of their occupational background, 96 (43%) were in the health care industry.  Among the other 128 respondents, virtually 
all (91%) had a business background.  The latter included directors with expertise in areas such as accounting, marketing, 
finance, law, public relations, and management consulting.  The results of t-tests and chi-square tests showed no significant 
differences between the HCB and NHCB groups with respect to their ages, gender, years of tenure, and  level of education.  
 
 Descriptive statistics for all seventeen measures of director involvement are displayed in Table 6.  The table also 
shows the rankings (based on the means of scores) of the responses provided by each group.  The analysis of these results 
was performed in three stages.  First, the Spearman rank-order correlation test was conducted to determine to what extent 
the rankings are similar.  The results (r s = 0.8596, p = 0.0006) indicate that there are no significant differences between the 
two sets and that they are positively correlated.  That is, there is a high degree of consistency between the two groups’ 
rankings. Closer examination of Table 6 shows that the means of the two groups’ scores on each of the items are different.  
For this reason, a second test was conducted to explore these differences.  A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
procedure was considered to be the most appropriate analytic technique.  It compensates for variable intercorrelation and 
provides an omnibus test of any multivariate effect.  The MANOVA revealed significant differences between   the HCB 
and NHCB directors (Wilks’ Λ = 0.4882, p = 0.0387).  That is, overall, the two groups exhibited different degrees of 
involvement. 
 
Finally,  to  understand  the  underlying  contributions  of  the  variables  to  the  significant multivariate effect, 
each of the seventeen dependent variables was tested using a series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with the 
two groups as our two levels of the independent variable.  The results, depicted in Table 7, show that differences between 
the HCB and NHCB samples were significant on fourteen of the seventeen variables.  No significant differences were 
found in the following areas: setting standards for rewarding top management’s performance, formally evaluating the 
performance of top management, and ensuring the hospital’s development of its human resources. However, it is important 
to note that, in fifteen of the seventeen areas, the NHCB directors’ mean scores were greater than the HCB group’s mean 
scores.   
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The present study is an attempt to partially fill a void by examining similarities and differences among hospital 
directors based on their occupational background.  It led to several insights about this relationship.  When the rankings 
shown in Table 6 are analyzed, several patterns emerge.  Overall, the scores of directors with a health care background are 
lower than those of their counterparts but there is a very high degree of agreement between the two groups in terms of the 
“ranking” of the items.  Specifically, the top seven items of the HCB sample correspond to the top seven items of the 
NHCB directors (P1A through P1G).  These are most directly related to broad, cross-functional strategic issues such as 
developing strategic alternatives, defining/reviewing the hospital’s mission-vision statement, reviewing the board’s overall 
role and responsibilities, and analyzing the internal and external environments.  Also, they address the hospital’s 
relationship with its major stakeholders. 
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Table 6.  Means
a
, Standard Deviations, And Rankings Of Scores Of Directors 
                                                                                                                                     Overall              HCB Directors                NHCB Directors        
                                                                                                                                      Score                     (n = 96)                             (n = 128)  
                                                                                                                                 ___________       ________________         _________________    
                                                                                                                           
Variable                                                                                                                  Mean      SD       Rank     Mean      SD       Rank      Mean    SD  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
Reviewing the board’s overall role and responsibilities     3.12     1.12       4    2.69   1.04           1       3.44     1.17 
Defining/reviewing the hospital’s mission/vision statement    3.11     0.97           3  2.82    1.12           2       3.32 0.84 
Conducting an analysis of the internal environment     2.91     0.96           7      2.53    0.86           4       3.20    1.02 
Conducting an analysis of the external environment      3.09     0.84        2       2.87     0.84         3     3.25     0.96 
Taking into account the legitimate interests of major stakeholders    2.91     0.94          5 
b 
   2.66     0.65           6       3.09     1.10 
Promoting the goodwill and support of major stakeholders     2.93     0.90            5
 b 
     2.66     0.73           5       3.14      1.01 
Developing strategic alternatives        3.01     0.74       1       2.95     0.41           7       3.05      0.30 
Providing advice and counsel in discussions outside of board/committee meetings 2.31     0.99       8       2.50     0.76          12       2.16      1.13 
Benchmarking the strategic plan with industry comparative data    2.71     1.03    10        2.43      1.09            8       2.92      0.98 
Setting standards for overall hospital performance     2.57     0.91       11       2.38      0.88            9        2.72     0.92 
Evaluating overall hospital performance against the strategic plan   2.49     1.05      12       2.30      0.99         10       2.64      1.08 
Analyzing financial information for important issues and trends   2.38  1.00   13       2.21     1.17          11      2.50      0.84 
Evaluating operating variances        1.90     0.92    14      1.74     0.96          13      2.02      0.88 
Reviewing the hospital’s overall structure      2.19     0.54      9      2.47     0.47          14       1.98     0.58 
Setting standards for rewarding top management’s performance    1.38      0.28      16      1.35    0.24         16       1.41   0.31 
Formally evaluating the performance of top management     1.25      0.54         17      1.22     0.19         17       1.27    0.69 
Ensuring the hospital’s development of human resources     1.52      0.72       15     1.44     0.56          15      1.58    0.81 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
                                                                                                                                          
a    
The scale ranged from 1 = no involvement to 4 = much involvement. 
 b  
 Denotes a tie. 
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Table 7.  ANOVA Results For Differences Between Directors Based On Their Background 
                                                                                                                                                          Group Means 
a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                ______________________________________________
                                           
                                                                                                                                       Directors with      Directors without 
                                                                                                                                         Health Care             Health Care                                             
                                                                                                                                         Background             Background 
Dependent Variables                                                                                                          (n=96)                      (n=128)                      F              p  
 
Reviewing the board’s overall role and responsibilities       2.69   3.44 24.77 .0000 
Defining/reviewing the hospital’s mission/vision statement      2.82  3.32 14.58 .0002 
Conducting an analysis of the internal environment        2.53  3.20 27.00 .0000 
Conducting an analysis of the external environment        2.87  3.25   9.55 .0023 
   Taking into account the legitimate interests of major stakeholders    2.66 3.09 11.62 .0008  
Promoting the goodwill and support of major stakeholders      2.66 3.14 15.57 .0001   
Developing strategic alternatives         2.95   3.05   4.44   .0361  
Providing advice and counsel in discussions outside of board/committee  
meetings            2.50  2.16   6.49 .0115  
Benchmarking the strategic plan with industry comparative data    2.43  2.92 12.45 .0005   
Setting standards for overall hospital performance       2.38  2.72   7.77 .0058  
Evaluating overall hospital performance against the strategic plan    2.30  2.64   5.84 .0165 
Analyzing financial information for important issues and trends     2.21 2.50   4.66 .0319   
Evaluating operating variances          1.74 2.02   5.13 .0244 
Reviewing the hospital’s overall structure         2.47 1.98 45.90 .0000  
Setting standards for rewarding top management’s performance     1.35   1.41      2.48 .1167   
Formally evaluating the performance of top management      1.22   1.27     .48 .4907  
Ensuring the hospital’s development of human resources 1.44  1.58   2.11 .1477  
          
                                                                                                                                                            
 
a  
The scale ranged from 1 = no involvement to 4 = much involvement. 
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  Five items (P2A through P2E) referred to benchmarking with industry data, setting standards for and evaluating 
the hospital’s performance, and analyzing and evaluating financial information and operating variances. The two groups’ 
rankings were somewhat similar.  With respect to developing human resources (P4B) and setting standards for – and 
evaluating – top management’s performance (P3A and P3B), the rankings were identical.  These three items were given the 
lowest scores by both samples.   This suggests that both groups were least interested in or preferred to limit their 
participation in these three areas. 
 
The results of the ANOVAs provided clear support for propositions P1A through P1G.  Compared to directors 
with a healthcare background, those without such a background were more involved in broad cross-functional issues.  
Likewise, the ANOVAs offered empirical support for propositions P2B through P2E.  Proposition P2A was not supported; 
although the analysis found significant differences between the two groups, those with a healthcare background were more 
involved in benchmarking the strategic plans with industry comparative data.   
 
The analysis does not provide confirmation of Propositions P3A, P3B, and P4B since no significant differences 
between the two groups were found.  Finally, propositions P1H and P4A were not supported. There was greater 
participation by the HCB group in providing advice and counsel outside of board/committee meetings and reviewing their 
hospitals’ structures.  However, it is interesting to note that, compared to directors who do not have a health care 
background, those with a health care background ranked these two items much higher.  
  
 Overall, directors who have a healthcare background were found to be less involved in developing, shaping, and 
evaluating corporate strategy than their counterparts who do not have such a background.  Various explanations could be 
advanced for these results.  Previous research provides a possible explanation.  Unlike those who have a healthcare 
background, many of whom are inside board members, those who do not have such a background tend to be more business-
oriented and to have a broader range of experience (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Witt, 1993; Gautam & Goodstein, 1996).  
They are likely to be business experts (e.g., directors of other organizations), support specialists (e.g., lawyers, accountants, 
and bankers) and influential persons in the community (e.g., prominent civic and political leaders, and university 
professors). They tend to bring with them experiences and access to information from different business environments and 
are more likely to compel management to consider a wider range of options (Hillman at al., 2000).   At the same time, they 
are more disposed to be more outspoken when an organization’s mission and strategy are discussed.  Indeed, the percentage 
of outside directors is considered to be an indicator of board power vis-à-vis top managers (Daily & Schwenk, 1996; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1991).   
 
On the other hand, inside directors work for the CEO – who is likely to chair the board - on a daily basis and 
would be more prone to conform to the CEO's wishes.  They depend directly on the CEO for their career advancements, 
and will thus be reluctant to oppose and challenge strategic proposals of the CEO.  Indeed, the independence of directors 
has been found to be an essential requirement for board effectiveness (Dalton et al., 1999).   This has led critics to charge 
that insiders cannot adequately monitor top management's performance (Gautam & Goodstein, 1996), and to calls for the 
inclusion of at least some outside directors to monitor the performance of the CEO and other managers (e.g. Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990). 
 
Therefore, one of this study's findings appears to be consistent with previous research.  Those who do not have a 
healthcare background, who are likely to be outsiders, tend to be more involved in shaping and monitoring corporate 
strategy than their counterparts with a healthcare background.  Since it is possible that their greater involvement can be 
explained not by their background but by the fact that they tend to be outsiders, future research efforts need to determine if 
differences in level of involvement exist between inside and outside hospital directors. 
 
Regarding the similarities between the two groups, it is interesting that the three items where the two groups’ 
scores were not significantly different also received the lowest scores from both groups. One possible explanation is that 
both groups view one of these issues – development of human resources - as the least “strategic” and more related to the 
day-to-day management of the organization.  Consequently, their involvement is focused on the other areas, namely 
strategic issues and overall organizational performance. With respect to the two other issues – setting standards for 
evaluating top management’s performance and formally evaluating the performance of top management – the results show 
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a reluctance by both groups to examine these two areas.  This interpretation is supported by studies that show CEO 
domination of the board and the directors’ need to ingratiate themselves or curry favor with the CEO (Westphal, 1999). 
 
Concerning the differences between the two groups, it is possible that directors whose occupational background is 
in health care are less interested in the organization’s strategic direction and more concerned with the immediate need to 
deliver quality services.  This interpretation would be consistent with the view that physicians traditionally have regarded 
hospitals as work sites for providing patient care, teaching, or doing research (Pauly & Redisch, 1973).  Thus, according to 
Molinari, Morlock, Alexander, and Lyles (1993), “given physician interests in state-of-the-art diagnostic and therapeutic 
technologies, it is plausible that medical staff board participation may result in imprudent capital investments that impair 
the fiscal viability of the hospital” (p. 360).  Also, Gautam and Goodstein (1996) contend that medical staff who serve on 
hospital boards place their greatest emphasis on patient care and technological breakthroughs.  This is further supported by 
Gardner (1992) who argues that nurses have a special role to play on hospital governing boards by keeping the board 
focused on the well-being of patients. She reports that quality assurance is one area of significance where those with a 
health care background can make a big difference to the board.  According to Gardner, those in the nursing profession 
believe that “our primary purpose is to serve patients.  We can serve as the conscience of the organization to keep it 
focused on its primary mission of patient care” (p. 27).  In contrast, directors with a business background are “concerned 
about rising health care expenses and curious about how providers are cutting costs” (Cross, 1996).  Attention to the bottom 
line is generally left to professional managers and community trustees  (Goes & Zhan, 1995).
 
  This view is in line with 
studies reporting that hospital directors whose occupations are not in health care - such as accounting, finance, marketing, 
and law - tend to be socialized in values of competitive and financial efficiency and  more attuned and sensitive to the 
requirements of the legal and regulatory environment (Gautam & Goodstein, 1996; Delbecq & Gill, 1988).
  
As mentioned 
earlier, those with a background in health care tend to be more concerned with issues related to patient well-being and the 
practice of medicine.  
 
These findings raise an important issue for the expanding literature on the composition of hospital boards of 
directors.  While prior research has focused primarily on the impact of the membership make-up of boards on issues such 
as social responsibility, training policies, and financial performance, there has been a dearth of research on the occupational 
background of directors.  The relationships we found between directors’ occupational background and their degree of 
participation raise potentially important strategic and ethical dilemmas for hospitals: board members with a health care 
background are not as concerned with strategic issues as their counterparts who have a business background.  Yet hospitals 
are under increased pressure to focus on financial performance and abide by numerous legal and regulatory requirements. 
On the other hand, society expects hospitals to provide quality health care and government agencies require them to be 
attentive to various regulations.  Hospital administrators, researchers, regulators, public policy advocates, and other 
stakeholders advocating changes in board membership may need to consider the implications of such measures. Also, it is 
important to note the limited involvement of both groups in setting standards for rewarding top management and evaluating 
their performance. 
 
Certainly, caveats must be offered regarding conclusions generated by this research.  Clearly, the differences 
between the two groups in terms of their degree of involvement reinforce the importance of examining the composition of 
hospital boards.   However, larger samples are needed to assess the robustness of these results.  Additional research is 
necessary to determine whether a director's level of participation does translate into organizational action. Also, since most 
board decisions are made by committees, in the future researchers may want to investigate the possible impact of group 
dynamics on member involvement.  Finally, board members' degree of involvement was reported by the directors 
themselves.  Although the possibility of bias cannot be completely ruled out, a number of authors have pointed out that 
self-report measures are indispensable in organizational research (Gupta & Beehr, 1982; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
 
 This 
is consistent with Steiner and Miner’s (1986) assertion that direct observation of top executives at work is not a practical 
approach; “only self-reports ... can provide an indication of the time ... spent in decision making and planning ...” (p. 195).  
Indeed, in certain research contexts, self-reports may provide more accurate estimates of population parameters than 
behavioral measures (Howard et al., 1980).  
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In conclusion the findings of this study highlight an area of growing concern to society and all types of 
organizations.  The directors' role in the strategic process is likely to expand due to increased risks of legal liability and the 
public’s (and patients’) unrelenting insistence for safe and high quality products and services.  In health care, the issue of 
board members' involvement is likely to gain increased attention because of societal demands on hospitals and many 
questions regarding the strategic dimensions of decision making.  The results are a reminder that major differences exist 
between directors with a background in healthcare and those without such a background.  This offers proponents of 
changes in board composition support for their normative suggestions.  
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